Information Meaning
When intuitive counterexamples have been proposed to each principle, epistemologists often responded by amending their theories, complicating the existing situations or including new ones. Much of this dialectic is chronicled totally by Shope 1983, to which the interested reader is directed. Cases like these, during which justified true perception seems in some important sense disconnected from the actual fact, have been made well-known in Edmund Gettie r’s 1963 paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? He proposed two supposed counterexamples to the claim that a belief’s being true and well justified is enough for its being information. In each of his imagined instances, an individual types a perception which is true and properly justified, yet which — this is the usual view, at any fee — isn't data. (These conditions came to be often known as Gettier circumstances, as did the various subsequent kindred circumstances.) For instance, in Gettier’s first case an individual Smith